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Review

Disseminating the national reconciliation commission report: A critical step in Ghana's democratic consolidation

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Truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) as transitional justice and conflict resolution mechanisms, have gained international prominence, especially following South Africa's much publicised TRC experience. Among other things, TRCs are expected to contribute to democratic consolidation by correcting the historical narrative, acknowledging past human rights violations and fostering a human rights culture in nascent democracies. This was the spirit in which Ghana's National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) executed its mandate from 2002 to 2004. However, a decade after the commission issued its final report, this article reflects on the failure of the Ghanaian state to disseminate the report. It is argued that the failure to disseminate the NRC Report could jeopardise the commission's potential contributions to sustainable reconciliation, human rights and democracy in Ghana. This article accounts for the failure to disseminate the report, and makes corrective recommendations as well as suggestions for future research.

Key words: Transitional justice, human rights, Ghana, national reconciliation commission, truth and reconciliation commissions, authoritarian enclaves.

INTRODUCTION

More than decade after Ghana's National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) delivered its final report following extensive hearings and consultations on the West African postcolonial nation's human rights past, the report is yet to be disseminated, and it might never be. The NRC was established by an Act of the Parliament in the J. A. Kufour New Patriotic Party (NPP) administration to investigate the country's history of extensive state-

sponsored human rights abuses. In establishing the NRC (a truth and reconciliation commission or TRC), the NPP administration and its parliamentary majority sought to denounce past incidents of human rights violations, assemble an accurate historical record that will inform the evolution of the nation's democratic dispensation, and develop human rights discourse in Ghana to contribute meaningfully to the consolidation of that

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dispensation. We suggest that a committed public communication of the report is vital to the achievement of the goals set for the NRC. By way of context, this paper briefly discusses the concept of TRCs as instruments of transitional justice, and also provides the background to the establishment of the NRC, its mandate, and its key findings. We examine the possibility of deepening a culture of human rights and informing political culture through the dissemination of a TRC's final report. This article then accounts for the failure to actively disseminate the NRC Report (a confirmation of a prediction made in a previous assessment of the NRC's impacts), and consequences of this failure. We conclude with some recommendations for disseminating the NRC Report in Ghana. Though Ghana's TRC experiment was concluded a decade ago, there is a paucity of work dedicated to its impacts.¹ This paper joins the conversation to engender more research in this regard, and hopefully, return the NRC's work to the public agenda in Ghana. While the article is Ghana-focused, the reflections herein are of consequence to future transitional justice initiatives in other parts of the world.

Truth commissions as transitional justice instruments

Transitional justice refers to "formal and informal procedures implemented by a group or institution of accepted legitimacy around the time of a transition out of an oppressive or violent social order, for rendering justice to perpetrators and their collaborators, as well as to their victims" (Kaminski et al., 2006: 295). Therefore, the key moments articulated in transitional justice discourse are: 1. A change in a nation's political dispensation from one of oppression and violence (e.g. a dictatorship or civil war) to one that values a respect for human rights and enjoys political legitimacy (e.g. through a popular vote); and , 2. Procedural structures established to confront past human rights abuses.

The field of transitional justice as an area of study developed rapidly in the aftermath of radical political transitions in Latin America and Eastern Europe in the eighties (du Toit, 1994), as well as the end of apartheid (and the consequent emergence of democracy) in South Africa in the nineties. It seeks to negotiate the ethical and legal conundrum created after repressive authoritarian governments have given way to democratic regimes (Hayner, 2011). The main concern is often that of dealing with past human rights abuses, while at the same time recognising the fragility of emergent democratic societies or regimes, and the threats posed by still powerful institutions and elements associated with former regimes (Benomar, 1995; Herz, 1989; Huyse, 1995; Rosenberg, 1999). The TRC is an instrument of transitional justice recognised as being viable in such circumstances (du Toit, 1994; Ignatieff, 1996; Rosenberg, 1999; Walzer, 1997). This is an official body tasked to "investigate and report on a pattern of past human rights

abuses"² (Hayner, 2011: 17), and the goals of establishing such a body are myriad, such as promoting reconciliation through knowledge of the truth about past human rights abuses, providing reparations and apologies to victims, and preventing a recurrence of past abuses (Hayner, 2011; Ignatieff 1996). Transitional justice scholar Priscilla Hayner also observes that the "the obligation about making public the truth about past abuses has been recognized as a state obligation under international law" (2011: 23). The NRC made a similar observation (2004 Vol. 1 Ch. 1: 1). In nascent democracies, the goals of a TRC are in part achieved through the publication of an accurate record of past human rights abuses, with the anticipation that a more accurate national historical narrative and a robust culture of human rights would result, which in turn would positively influence political culture (Adu-Berinyuu, 2004; Gibson, 2004; Hayner, 2011; Reddy, 2004-2005).

Historical context of human rights abuses in Ghana

The violence and human rights abuses located in Ghana's history do not compare with the human rights abuses and social convulsions that have wracked other African countries such as South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Liberia (Ameh, 2006a; 2006b). As Ghanaian academic Robert Ameh observes, "having had the same President from 1981 to 2000; four successful democratic elections in 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004; and the first ever change in government through the ballot box in 2000, Ghana could be described as one of the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa that has enjoyed a relatively long period of political stability" (2006b: 85). Following the Ameh's assessment, Ghana has successfully held two more elections: one in 2008, and the other in 2012. That the 2008 presidential elections were decided by a razor-thin margin of approximately 0.50 percent (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009), and the 2012 elections were finally settled by a Supreme Court decision without the nation degenerating into a violent upheaval, is further evidence of Ghana's promising democratic credentials. Yet, Ghana's political history is replete with gross human rights violations and ethnic conflicts that have spawned legacies which threaten social cohesion, development, and Ghana's nascent democracy (Ameh, 2006a; 2006b). This is traceable to colonialism, the violent inter-political conflicts that characterised the struggle for independence, as well as the numerous coups d'état that have occurred in Ghana since independence in 1957.

The last two military governments that resulted from these coups d'état, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or AFRC (1979) and the Provisional National Defence Council or PNDC (1981-1992) were particularly brutal, and during those regimes, human rights violations became endemic to the Ghanaian body politic. Ameh classifies these two regimes, both led by Jerry John Rawlings, as being "the most violent political

regimes in Ghana's political history" (2006a: 347). Ghanaian political scientist Kwame Boafo-Arthur also describes the PNDC regime as "a decentralised structure of tyranny and violence" (2005: 104; see also Oduro, 2005; Alidu and Ameh, 2012). As the NRC hearings disclosed, these regimes were characterised by killings and detentions without trial, sexual assaults, torture, trials without due process, disappearances, arbitrary confiscation of property, illegal dismissals, and a wide range of human rights violations (Ameh, 2006a: 347). This prompted the Commission to conclude, in Hobbessian terms, that the AFRC-PNDC eras constituted "a period of bloodletting" during which "life was solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (NRC, 2004, Vol. 1 Ch. 5: 105).

In 1992, bowing to international and domestic pressure, the PNDC ushered Ghana back to civilian multi-party democracy, but entrenched in the 4th Republican Constitution indemnity clauses that preclude any prosecutions of state functionaries who have in the past committed human rights abuses. This measure was reminiscent of legislative strategies deployed by the military junta in Argentina prior to leaving office in 1983, and Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet's Amnesty Law in 1978 (Hayner, 2011). Consequently, the transition to multiparty democracy in Ghana can be described as what Samuel Huntington calls a "transformation" (1995: 65). This is a transition in which an outgoing authoritarian regime is sufficiently strong, such that "those in power in the authoritarian regime take the lead and play a decisive role in ending the regime and changing it into a democratic system" (Huntington, 1995: 65). This makes it possible for dominant elements within the outgoing authoritarian regime to determine the nature of the emerging democracy, to legislate amnesties, and "make the amnesties stick" (Huntington, 1995: 70). This is the category in which Huntington places pre-1990 transitions in Latin America such as regime changes in Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala, where, as in the Ghanaian case, outgoing regimes succeeded in legislating amnesties (Huntington, 1995). Similarly, in Ghana, the PNDC was well positioned to determine the entire transitional process. Led by the military head of state, Jerry Rawlings, it successfully transformed itself into a left-of-centre political party: the National Democratic Congress (NDC), and thus was able to legitimise itself by participating in the multiparty democratic process that it had initiated. After successfully winning two elections (in 1992 and 1996) and thereby further consolidating itself as a force in Ghanaian politics, the NDC lost elections to the liberal democratic New Patriotic Party (NPP) in 2000. It is against this background that the NRC was established.

The NRC in Ghana

In 2002, the Kufuor-led NPP administration through the Parliament of Ghana established the National

Reconciliation Commission (NRC) to investigate the extensive post-independence state-sponsored human rights violations and abuses.

The NRC policy was a plank in the NPP's platform during the 2000 elections, and a policy priority for the party after it won elections in December 2000, so that within a year of being in office, the NPP introduced the National Reconciliation Bill in Parliament (Ameh, 2006b: 85). Although the autocratic PNDC era gave way to a democratic dispensation in 1992, in reality, the NPP was the first post-autocratic transitional administration as it signaled a major break from the autocratic past. Thus, the subsequent legislative process leading to the passage of the *National Reconciliation Act (Act 611)* was fraught with controversy both in and outside Parliament (Ameh, 2006b: 86). While the NPP majority in Parliament championed what they argued to be the laudable human rights goals of a TRC, the NDC, which constituted a vocal and powerful minority, rejected a truth commission, framing it as witch-hunt. As noted above, the NDC is the civilian successor to the authoritarian AFRC and the PNDC. It therefore had a lot of political capital to lose if the human rights abuses perpetrated under those regimes were brought to the fore (Alidu and Ameh, 2012). Outside Parliament and in Ghana's vibrant mass mediasphere (this was before the proliferation of social media), the public engaged in a vigorous debate over the necessity of a TRC, and if so, the historical period to be covered by its mandate. The public was also interested in the membership of the proposed TRC, and what the subject matter of its mandate should be (Ameh, 2006b: 86).

The conflict surrounding the NRC Bill in Ghana was not novel. In the case of Guatemala, for example, civil society and victims' groups seeking a stronger mandate for the Historical Clarification Commission set up in 1994 to investigate human rights abuses after more than thirty years of civil war, effectively delayed the start of the commission's work for more than three years (Hayner, 2011: 32). In South Africa, parties in opposition to the post-apartheid government of the African National Congress (ANC) expressed animosity towards the setting up of a TRC in 1995 (Boraine, 2000). The Afrikaner Freedom Front, for example, alleged that the TRC was merely a witch-hunt against the former regime (Boraine, 2000: 39). As in the Ghanaian context, some opponents of the ANC felt that given their actions in the apartheid era, they had a lot to lose politically from an examination of the past. Yet, it is significant that eighty-five percent of Ghanaians surveyed by the highly respected Ghana Center for Democracy and Development (CDD-Ghana) were in favour of a TRC (CDD-Ghana, 2001).

The NRC'S mandate

Section 2 of the NRC law, *Act 611*, stipulated that the NRC was to be constituted by a Chair and eight other

members, all of whom were to be appointed by the President of Ghana in consultation with the Council of State (a constitutionally-mandated body that advises the President). The object of the NRC under section 3 of *Act 611* was “to seek and promote national reconciliation among the people of this country by establishing an accurate, complete and historical record of violations and abuses of human rights inflicted on persons by public institutions and holders of public office during periods of unconstitutional government...” While the NRC was to mainly focus on periods of unconstitutional rule in Ghana, *viz.*, 24 February 1966 to 21 August 1969, 13 January 1972 to 23 September 1979, and 31 December 1981 to 6 January, 1993, it was also mandated to pursue its object by investigating abuses that occurred between 6 March 1957 (the date of Ghana’s independence from colonial rule) and 6 January, 1993 (the inception of the current democratic dispensation), upon application by any person.

The NRC was mandated to investigate violations and human rights abuses within its mandate period that fell under the rubric of “killings, abductions, disappearances, detentions, torture, ill treatment and seizure of properties” perpetrated against persons by “public institutions, public office holders or persons purporting to have acted on behalf of the state” (S.4, *Act 611*). As well, the NRC was to “investigate any other matters which it considers requires investigation in order to promote and achieve national reconciliation.” Within three months of concluding its work, the NRC was to submit its final report, which, among other things, would “suggest measures to prevent and avoid the repetition of ...violations and abuses” (S. 20.2, *Act 611*). The NRC was also to make recommendations to the President for redressing the wrongs suffered as a result of past human rights violations. The life of the NRC was to come to an end after the submission of its final report but the process of national reconciliation would be recognised as work in progress.

In May 2002, President Kufuor inaugurated the NRC, having earlier appointed its members in consultation with the Council of State. The NRC was to be chaired by Justice K. E. Amua-Sekyi, a retired Supreme Court Judge. The eight other commissioners were: Catholic cleric Most Reverend Charles Palmer-Buckle; Maulvi Abdul Wahab Bin Adam, Ameer (Head) and Missionary-in-Charge, Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission, Ghana; Professor Florence Dolphyne, former Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ghana; Lt-Gen E. A. Erskine, First Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon; educationist Dr. Sylvia Boye; trade unionist Christian Appiah-Agyei; traditional ruler Uborr Dalafu Labal II; and Law Professor Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu. The president also appointed as executive secretary of the NRC, Dr. Kenneth Agyeman Attafua, a human rights scholar and the Director of Public Education and Anti-Corruption at the constitutionally mandated Commission

for Human Rights and Administrative Justice.

THE NRC’S FINDINGS

The objectives of the Commission embraced not just individuals who had suffered from these human rights violations and abuses, but also the Ghanaian society as whole. Parliament rationalised that confronting past human rights violations was necessary not only to reconcile the nation by assuaging the pain and hurt of victims, but also for the purposes of consolidating democracy, as well as promoting constitutional rule and a culture of respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms. The Commission was interested in the factors and conditions that underpinned, enabled, and accounted for those violations and abuses, and how these violations and abuses can be avoided, going forward. It was in the foregoing context that the Commission, after taking statements from the public, considering 4,240 petitions from persons resident in Ghana and abroad,³ and conducting investigations and hearings across the country, rendered its report.

Cumulatively, the Commission observed “a general lack of knowledge and consciousness and respect for human rights in the country” (NRC 2004 Vol. 3 Ch. 1: 28). A culture of human rights was absent from the nation’s socio-political deep structure as a non-negotiable value. Thus, while a higher number of abuses were reported regarding military regimes, even constitutional administrations yielded records of human rights violations (NRC 2004 Vol. 3 Ch. 3: 150-151).

To address Ghana’s history of egregious human rights abuses that the NRC documented in its report, the Commission made a number of recommendations to be carried out by the state, including the payment of monetary reparations to victims of past human rights violations, the establishment of medical trauma facilities, symbolic reparations, community reparations, restitution for victims of illegal property seizures, institutional reforms, and a reconsideration of the indemnity clauses. It must however be noted that while the NRC public hearings enjoyed extensive coverage on print and electronic media platforms in Ghana and abroad, its report has not been disseminated, beyond excerpts in the media immediately following its release.

The importance of TRC reports

As the Chilean (Adu-Berinyuu, 2004) and South African (Gibson, 2004) examples show, TRCs are expected, through their educative and transformative functions to consolidate democracy and a culture of human rights in their respective national communities. South African Political scientist Andre du Toit argues that truth commissions have the function of “generating and

consolidating new and distinctive conceptions of political morality that can henceforth inform the political culture” (2000: 125). American political scientist James Gibson, who has written extensively on South African politics, believes that it was in this vein that South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission urged that its report be widely disseminated, on the assumption that a wide circulation and readership would translate into a more successful adoption of human rights values in South Africa (2004: 6). Civil society scholar Paavani Reddy also notes as follows:

The truth commissions, through analysing the testimony of victims, establish the truth about gross human rights violations, which were often denied by the Government. Who were the victims? What were the injustices done to them? Why were these crimes committed and by whom? Commission reports clarify, document and publicise the tortured past, opening it to wide public discussion. This documentation becomes part of the national consciousness and helps to build a culture of respect for human rights and to prevent such crimes from happening again. It also reduces the potential for future denials about the past and conflict over such contention (2004-2005:20).

The mass dissemination of a TRC report is therefore critical to the overall success of a TRC program in shaping national historical narratives and social attitudes. In this regard, it is relevant to consider the following observation made by American jurist Stephan Landsman: Truth commissions can serve even more effectively than trials to educate the citizenry to the nature and extent of prior wrongdoing. Since they are not limited to the individualised facts of a set of prosecutions, they can marshal and disseminate all the relevant facts about an oppressive regime. The record a truth commission can develop is the most powerful tool available to inoculate a society against dictatorial methods (1996: 88).

Gibson’s study has shown that the South African TRC may have significantly contributed to more sensitive attitudes towards human rights in South Africa (2004: 46). To borrow from his assessment of the contribution of South Africa’s TRC to the fostering of a culture of human rights and respect for the rule of law in South Africa, culture in this sense refers not just to the practices of institutional elements (such as the judiciary and security apparatus) but also to “the beliefs, values, and attitudes of ordinary citizens” (Gibson, 2004: 6). The assumption is that a concern for a culture of human rights must go beyond state institutions to encompass civil society (Aidoo, 1993: 713). According to Gibson, “a human rights culture is one in which people value human rights highly, are unwilling to sacrifice them under most circumstances, and jealously guard against intrusions into those rights. Such a culture may stand as a potent (but not omnipotent) impediment to political repression” (2004: 6). Gibson also lists several values and attitudes as being central to a culture of human rights, including “support for

the rule of law; political tolerance, rights consciousness, support for due process, commitment to individual freedom; and commitment to democratic institutions and processes” (2004: 9). To these we add a collective commitment to defending the rights of others against oppression. As the NRC Report (2004 Vol. 3 Ch. 1) reflects, at all material times, this particular value was lacking in Ghanaian cultural discourse.

Without the educative element, the entire rationale for having a TRC instead of prosecutions, is defeated, as human rights concepts emphasised in commission reports do not enter the deep structure of public discourse or state practice. Also, the closest a TRC comes to providing retributive justice for deserving victims is through its individual and institutional accountability role (Posner and Vermeule, 2004). Without an effective dissemination of the commission’s record, this role is defeated; further entrenching impunity and deepening the bitterness felt by marginalised groups and victims, with the potential to unleash future acts of vengeance that could lead to political destabilisation. This is because to the extent that a TRC report incorporates the voices of victims, it recognises and acknowledges their pain and hurt. When a report is muted, the consequence is an attenuation victim voice and agency. Therefore, as Brahm points out, the extent to which a truth commission’s findings are accessible to the public is vital for the achievement of a stronger impact (Brahm, 2007).

As well, TRCs often barter immunity for information, information that would help rectify the record and raise awareness (Landsman, 1996). In this regard, the TRC’s narrative informs future politics. Citizens develop a critical awareness of the past and can make informed political choices in the future, especially choices regarding political actors or public policy proposals. Michael Ignatieff observes that a truth commission has the potential to “reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public discourse” (1996: 112). He also notes that “truth” commissions can and do change the frame of public discourse and public memory,” and that “the past is an argument and the function of truth commissions, like the function of honest historians, is simply to purify the argument, to narrow the range of permissible lies” (1996: 113). In Ghana, the value of the NRC is that it successfully constructed a cumulative record of the systemic nature of state oppression, a record which would create awareness, especially for those born after the return to constitutional rule in 1992, who might have laboured under the impression that state oppression existed only in isolated incidents. While it is possible that some citizens might decline to accept a TRC’s “truth” because of real or perceived bias, or because a commission’s truth might be politically harmful to a category of the society (such as perpetrators in South Africa, Latin America, and Ghana), without efforts to actively publicise the commission’s

report, how would the commission's 'truth' enter the public sphere so that it would be subjected to necessary contestation? It is relevant at this point to account for the existence in Ghana of what Chilean sociologist Manuel Garreton describes as "authoritarian enclaves" (1994: 233) that nestle cheek-by-jowl with democratic institutions in nascent democracies. These enclaves include the legacy of human rights violations from previous regimes, the institutionalisation of constitutional or legislative elements that constrain democratic practice, the existence of certain powerful actors who are not absorbed into the democratic context and who threaten the new democratic dispensation, and fourthly, "the generalised presence of anti-democratic and authoritarian values, mentalities and attitudes" (Garreton, 1994: 233). The last enclave that Garreton identifies provides the enabling environment for human rights abuses.

In Ghana, these enclaves are constituted by elements such as the constitutional indemnity clauses, exercises in what we call "human rights revisionism," and the continued strength of the political party that represents the interests of two of the erstwhile repressive regimes. The choice of a TRC instead of the prosecution of perpetrators of past crimes of human rights abuse often signals the continued political strength of these perpetrators, hence the need for a certain degree of accommodation and compromise (Ross, 2004; Oduro, 2005). The Ghanaian case is no different, as we have pointed out in this paper when describing Ghana's transition as a transformation *a la* Huntington. While the NPP discontinued hitherto official state commemorations of the AFRC and PNDC interventions, senior functionaries of the NDC, which was voted into office again in 2008 after eight years in opposition and remains in power, religiously observe these commemorations in pomp and pageantry, during which speakers routinely engage in human rights revisionism by attempting to rationalise the atrocities committed during those regimes.⁴ The foregoing dynamics make the dissemination of the NRC Report an even more urgent exercise.

THE FAILURE TO DISSEMINATE THE NRC REPORT

Although the NRC hearings were given extensive attention by the mass media, the hearings were pieces of the nation's historical tapestry that needed to be synthesised to make complete sense. This is why the NRC Report, compiled at the end of its hearings and analyses, is important. The NRC Report (five volumes and almost 1500 pages long) was subsequently summarised for easier public access and consumption by CDD Ghana in 2005, and then launched in the various regions of Ghana. CDD Ghana has also held meetings with heads of institutions that came up for negative mention in the report, to discuss post-report reforms.

Beyond the CDD initiative, little else was done to disseminate the report.

Significantly, the NPP administration committed to dissemination when it issued a White Paper in acceptance of the NRC Report, as evidenced by the following excerpt:

Government is satisfied that Ghana can make greater strides if all of us become true apostles and disciples of human rights and raise our collective voices loudly against their violation and abuse. Educational administrations, teachers, and researchers must study the Report of the Commission carefully. Government accordingly directs that copies of the Report should be made available in all school libraries by the Ministry of Education. This should extend to private schools as well. Appropriate parts, as determined by teachers and curriculum developers, should be made required reading. We must all be united in our commitment to ensuring that these violations and abuses would never again occur. (Government of Ghana, 2005)

However, the administration did not follow through with the laudable aspirations outlined above, and made no attempt to ensure the implementation of those policy initiatives.

Human rights researcher Nahla Valji notes that in Sierra Leone, UNICEF has produced a special report on that country's truth commission for the youth, and the Working Group on Truth and Reconciliation has launched a textbook version of the report complete with cartoons and exercise questions to be used in secondary schools (Valji, 2006). Many will find untenable the response of a former attorney general of Ghana that while such an idea is worthwhile, the NPP administration had neither the funds nor a plan to do so (Valji, 2006). As at June 2007, the NPP administration, on the recommendations of the NRC, had paid various sums of money as reparations to victims of past human rights abuse (Adoma-Yeboah, 2007b; Asare, 2008). While such reparations are an essential aspect of the truth and reconciliation process and have a social justice imperative,⁵ the administration could have mobilised the comparatively minimal resources required to finance a distribution of the Commission's report to schools, as the administration committed to do in its white paper. Yet, inquiries conducted by CDD-Ghana at our request disclosed that this commitment has not been followed through.⁶ And as far back as November 2007, Dr. Agyeman-Attafuah who was the executive secretary of the NRC, expressed disquiet about the government's focus on financial reparations to the exclusion of other recommendations made by the NRC (Adoma-Yeboah, 2007a).⁷

To further assess the penetration of the NRC narrative within the public sphere, we conducted a search on *Ghanaweb.com*, a news database that aggregates news reports from Ghana. Like Tsikata (2009), we make the assumption that news databases like *Ghanaweb* serve as

a virtual Habermasian public sphere within which citizens engage with or are exposed to matters of public interest. Therefore, the extent to which the NRC's work continues to be of interest to Ghanaians will be reflected by how often the NRC is referenced substantially in public discourse.

Using the phrase "National Reconciliation Commission," we searched *Ghanaweb* year by year. For the year 2015, there were six entries, with three being the same news story. In all, the NRC had been mentioned in passing and not as the subject of the item. Even when human rights violations occurred, there were no references to the NRC Report in the media. For example when police brutally suppressed a peaceful protest against the Electoral Commission in September 2015 (Bonsu, 2015), none of the resulting commentaries referenced the NRC Report to caution against state-sanctioned political violence. The search results for 2014 were slightly better, with twenty-two items, though again, the NRC was often mentioned in passing.⁸ Not even the tenth anniversary of the NRC Report merited mention. For 2013, there were twelve items, following a similar pattern. 2012 yielded twenty-six items. The foregoing pales into comparison with the number of news items for 2004 (three hundred and fifty-five), 2005 (eighty-one) and 2006 (forty-two). From 2007 (when there were twenty-five hits), the number appears to decline radically. The declining numbers could be due to a decrease in salience as the NRC became more distant in time. But it also signals a decline in significance within the public sphere. It is telling that in 2014, the NRC was not commemorated in Ghana despite its significant contributions and the NRC's recommendation that annual reconciliation lectures be organised "to foster human rights, rule of law and democratic principles" (NRC 2004 Vol. 1, Ch 7: 173).

ACCOUNTING FOR THE FAILURE TO DISSEMINATE THE NRC REPORT

As noted above, the NPP administration did little to publicise the NRC Report. The administration made the executive summary of the report available on the Ghana Government website. As Attafuah (2007) argues, this was a commendable but inadequate measure, because "Internet access in Ghana is very limited and unreliable" (Fosu, 2011: 494) especially for the working poor or those in rural areas. In any event, the link to the report, <http://www.ghana.gov.gh/NRC/index.php>, has been defunct for several years.

The strongest reason for the failure of the NPP administration to disseminate the NRC Report lies in the lack of institutional plans to do so. Valji notes that when the government accepted the NRC Report and pledged to publicise same, it did not provide a clear plan or roadmap for dissemination (Valji, 2006: 41). A clear report dissemination strategy was also missing from the

NRC's mandate. Indeed, the NRC itself did not include a clear dissemination strategy in its report, save for a recommendation that "The findings of the Commission should be used as teaching materials and scripts for drama, film-making, etc., to educate the nation to avoid similar human rights abuses in the future" (2004 Vol. 3 Ch.1: 28). Therefore, once the NRC fell off the public agenda, there was no mechanism in place to ensure that its report was disseminated. As well, as with any government, the administration was faced with multiple priorities and the NRC agenda could not be sustained as a priority (Valji, 2006: 26, Hayner, 2011: 57). Our reading of Valji's paper, as well as conversations with key players such as the CDD's Gyimah-Boadi and Oduro, and the NRC's Agyeman-Attafuah, together with a careful reflection on the NPP's actions in regards to the NRC and its report suggest other factors that influenced the failure to actively disseminate the report.

One key reason was the loss of the NRC's champion in the NPP's policy implementation process. Specifically, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, the NPP's first Attorney General and Minister of Justice, a human rights activist who was closely connected to transitional justice advocates and championed the NRC process, was reassigned to the Foreign Ministry less than a year into the life of the NRC. His portfolio successors in the Attorney General's Department at the time the NRC Report was released did not show as active an interest in the NRC concept. Akufo-Addo is the NPP presidential candidate in the 2016 elections and it will be interesting to observe how he handles the dormant NRC file in the event that he is successful in the elections.

Another factor for the failure to disseminate the report lies in the NRC's observation of the absence of a culture of human rights in Ghana during its mandate period. The absence of a culture of human rights in Ghana signals an absence of an institutional capacity to properly conceive of the normative dimensions of human rights. While the administration was committed to human rights and national reconciliation, and hence paid out reparations, the administration was more focused on the pragmatic aspects of human rights than the normative, philosophical dimensions of the concept.⁹ This normative deficiency is one that public policy scholar David Crocker warns against in his (1999) discussion of transitional justice mechanisms. That is not to say that the payment of reparations lacks moral basis. However, where a government focuses solely on economic reparations to the exclusion of equally relevant symbolic and informational transitional justice recommendations, it brings into the question its understanding of the normative implications of transitional justice. It also demonstrates a narrow view toward reparations, as it privileges financial over symbolic reparations, and thus excludes those who need a symbolic recognition of their pain. Without such symbolic recognition, true reconciliation will remain elusive in Ghana.

The NPP administration's approach to the NRC Report might also have been a result of the existing authoritarian enclaves identified above. These include the continued survival and even dominance of elements associated with past authoritarian regimes. The NPP might have been cautious in handling transitional justice issues, and hence, preferred making monetary reparations to actively publicising the roles of the dominant political elements in the perpetration of past human rights abuses, interpreting its pragmatic approach as being less confrontational, and less prone to allegations of witch-hunting.¹⁰ The point about authoritarian enclaves ties into another significant reason why the report has not been disseminated. The NDC was elected to form the ruling government again in December 2008. As previously explained, the NDC had been hostile to the NRC *ab initio* and therefore there was no policy commitment to furthering the work of the NRC once the party took office. The party subsequently won the 2012 elections.

CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

As Ghana continues to make strides in its democratic experiment, it is obvious that there is still work to be done to ensure the growth and sustenance of a democratic culture in the nation. For example, the rise of media irresponsibility in the form of ill-managed talk-shows that provide a platform for political intolerance and ethnic incitement potentially attenuate the public sphere (Fletcher, 2014: 27) and negatively impacts democratic development. Political violence and violent political discourse have gained disturbing proportions in recent years,¹¹ and dominant political parties are all affiliated to armed militias.¹² Indeed, political violence exists not only at the inter-party level but also at the intra-party level, often resulting in serious casualties among political rivals, a recent example being the politically-motivated acid attack on an NPP regional chairman in May 2015. The victim died as a result of horrific acid burns (Abdul-Hamid, 2015). Despite the NRC's recommendations (2004 Vol. 3 Ch.1), there are still incidents of state security abuse of detention powers and disregard for judicial orders (see Baneseh, 2016 for a recent example), as well as the use of the state security apparatus to protect regime interests (see Ibrahim, 2016 for a recent example). It is not uncommon these days for opinion leaders, including those in the NPP, to muse publicly about either the desirability of a military intervention in Ghanaian politics or the inevitability of one, going forward.¹³ These are all inconsistent with a meaningful mainstream pro-democratic human rights culture, and true national reconciliation.

In this article, we have attempted to emphasise the importance of disseminating the NRC Report to contribute meaningfully to democracy in Ghana especially by

mainstreaming a more accurate historical narrative and a robust culture of human rights in Ghana. We have also accounted for the failure to actively disseminate the NRC Report. Valji's comparative examples of truth commission report dissemination sum up our views on the subject:

An adequate dissemination strategy for the work of a truth commission is an integral component to the commission's long-term success and relevance. In particular, in the absence of a policy aimed at integrating both the work and findings of a truth commission into the curricula of schools, there is no impact made on subsequent generations and no lasting contribution to understanding the role of military rule in violence and oppression. Moreover, proper dissemination furthers acknowledgement for the victims and is in itself a form of reparation. In Argentina, where the CONADEP report has been reprinted no less than 25 times, one victim said, 'It is the most read book in the history of Argentina... CONADEP is still having an impact on new generations.' Some truth commissions, after the initial investment of time, money, and human resources in collecting the information, have seen that their reports have no reach or impact. Such was the case in Uganda; after eight years of work, the final report, containing 720 pages of testimony, analysis, and recommendations, along with names of victims, has never made it beyond the hands of a select few in government and donor offices. (2006: 41-42)

Transitional justice scholar Joanna Quinn has also argued that one of the undoings of the Ugandan truth commission is that its report was not disseminated to the public, with the effect that only the Commissioners were impacted by the enormity of the testimony given during the commission's hearings (Quinn, 2004). Thus, there has been little opportunity for the Ugandan commission to effect change in the wider national community.

Sadly, this paper confirms the predictions Valji made in 2006, just two years after the NRC had wrapped up, that "the reality is that implementation of the [NRC's] recommendations, beyond a reparations policy, is unlikely to happen in the near future, if at all" (2006: 41) due to a lack of monitoring commitment on the part of the NPP administration.

While the NPP administration that commissioned the NRC is no longer in office, the work of the NRC is relevant to Ghana, irrespective of the political party in power. With all its limitations, the NRC, like South Africa's TRC, offered Ghana a bloodless, less acrimonious path to transitional justice. The human rights culture that the NRC advocated continues to be relevant, although we fear that with the current dominance of the NDC in Ghana, the possibilities of the NRC Report being disseminated are minimal.¹⁴ This is because as stated above, the NDC has been ideologically opposed to the NRC. It views the NRC as disproportionately targeting the party's ideological origins¹⁵ (Alidu and Ameh, 2012). That

being said, continuing with the NRC agenda will be a politically wise choice for the NDC as it will promote true reconciliation with people who might be hostile to the party because they (or loved ones) suffered under its predecessor military regimes. Following through with the NPP's commitment to disseminate the NRC Report will also demonstrate the NDC's commitment to human rights.

We recommend that the government returns the NRC Report to its website, and strikes a committee to disseminate the NRC Report. This committee will coordinate the National Commission for Civic Education, the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice, the Ministry of Education and the Ghana Education Service, the communications arms of the government, as well as civil society bodies to publicise and stimulate public discourse around the report. To these key state actors, we add the Ministry of Education, and the Ghana Education Service. These institutions must take active steps to integrate the NRC Report into the school curricula in Ghana. As well, the report itself must be rendered in as many accessible versions as possible. Also, there is a need for documentary films and other media products that would raise awareness about the NRC's findings, and generate public discussion around the report. We suggest that if he becomes president of Ghana in 2016, Akufo-Addo considers the recommendations made herein to complete the significant contributions he made to the NRC process.

Our recommendations are without prejudice to the realisation of all the other recommendations made by the NRC to the Government. We see the recommendations as being mutually complementary, and in this regard, Attafuah's (2007) matrix of outstanding recommendations that government, civil society organisations, and the public must carry out, is a useful policy roadmap.

We have approached the subject with the assumption that the Ghanaian state has the greatest responsibility in the dissemination of the NRC Report. However, civil society also has a role, despite relatively limited resources as compared to the state. We therefore recommend that civil society reinstates the NRC Report on the public agenda, especially through media interventions when issues of potential human rights abuse arise. In other words, the elements from the report must be moments in the articulation of civil society discursive responses to human rights issues or crises. Civil society must also consider how abridged versions of the report can be made available to Ghanaians in the various local languages. Further, in the contemporary media ecology, it is possible for civil society organisations to upload the report to their websites and social media as a research resource.

What about other jurisdictions that might consider the TRC option, going forward? The Ghanaian experience should inform a TRC model that is well resourced, has a strong public communication mandate and strategy, and

a clear plan for report dissemination.

The failure to disseminate the NRC Report creates the risk of collective amnesia about the commission's findings and its exhortation that "Never again shall such wrongs be a feature of governance or a feature of life in this beautiful land of our birth" (2004 Vol. 1 Ch. 8: 182; Vol. 3 Ch.1: 2). Democracy is still at a nascent stage in Ghana, and the NRC was an essential policy instrument with the potential to positively impact the country's political development. As Serbian jurist Nenad Dimitrijevic (2006) argues, post-transitional societies require the development of new ethical and moral foundations to replace what has been entrenched under authoritarian, criminal regimes, hence, the value of TRCs as instruments of transitional justice. In that sense, the task of "addressing the past in order to change policies, practices, and even relationships in the future, and to do so in a manner that respects and honors those who were affected by the abuses" (Hayner, 2011: 11) is considered a *raison d'être* for truth commissions. That the strong authoritarian enclaves identified in this paper continue to exist is sufficient evidence of the threats facing the development of true democracy and national reconciliation in Ghana. In the near future, an empirical study such as that conducted by Gibson (2004) to determine the success of the TRC in South Africa in mainstreaming a culture of human rights would be vital to assess the effectiveness of Ghana's NRC.

Conflict of interests

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

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¹For example, Oduro's (2005) comprehensive article on Ghana's NRC, published immediately following the completion of the NRC's work, looks more at rationales for the TRC model in Ghana and prospects of success. Similarly, Ameh's (2006a) article on the NRC sheds light on the public discourse surrounding the setting up of the commission, and provides rationalisations for the choice of a TRC in Ghana. His second article (Ameh, 2006b) on the subject deals with the NRC's approach to truth in its hearings. His recent work on the NRC, written with Alidu (2012) focuses on the role of civil society organisations in the NRC's work. Valji's (2006) comparative assessment of the NRC some months after it concluded its work, provides a good point of departure for this paper. As well, Hayner's (2011) treatment of the NRC, while limited in scope, provides critical observations.

² While a truth commission in the strict sense is merely a fact-finding body, some truth commissions have "the mandate of promoting reconciliation" (Hayner, 2011: 19). Within the context of this article, however, the terms "truth commission" and "truth and reconciliation commission" are used interchangeably as Ghana's commission had a dual fact-finding and reconciliatory intent.

³ As Hayner notes, the number of petitions "surprised the skeptics, who had argued that the small number of human rights violations in Ghana did not justify a truth commission" (2011: 56).

⁴ We argue that holding such commemorative events (and similar occasions that offer a platform to perpetrators of human rights abuse such as Rawlings) constitute human rights revisionism, to the extent that symbolically, they are held to rationalise and celebrate the atrocities of those regimes. For example, addressing youth in the Volta Region of Ghana in January 2014, Rawlings appeared to gloat over the executions that the AFRC had carried out, as well as the destruction of a market in Accra, an act that deprived hundreds of traders of their livelihood (Appiah, 2014).

⁵ There is concern about a perceived bias of transitional justice in favour of normative, dispute resolution justice, and reconciliation, at the expense of social justice, in terms of economic, social and cultural rights (Mamdani, 1996; Stanley, 2002; Arbour, 2007; Miller, 2008; Millar 2011; Lanegran, 2015). It is argued that often, in post-conflict societies, some form of communal redistributive justice is required, with post-apartheid South Africa as a case in point. Such scholars

believe that while the South African TRC may have succeeded in preventing the country from imploding as a result of racial and political animosities, it failed to empower the marginalised black population in economic terms (Boesak, 2005). The potential for TRCs to achieve social justice results, has however been acknowledged (Verwoerd 1999; Asmal 2000; Arbour 2007; Janesick, 2007). We see social justice as being implicated in the TRC model, as one cannot have meaningful social justice in the absence of a human rights culture and the prevention of impunity. As well, the payment of reparations based on a TRC recommendation performs a social justice role in the form of financial assistance to victims who lost property or breadwinners (Stanley 2002), though some view the payment of reparations to individuals rather than collective reparations as inadequate for social justice purposes (Arbour 2007). It must be noted that the focus of the NRC was on systemic impunity, rather than on individual cases of human rights abuse. Yet, one must remain cognisant of the following observation regarding the work of the NRC in Ghana:

For reparations to be effective and promote sustainable coexistence, they should provide grounding for a future based on social justice, while counter-balancing the decision to displace criminal justice in the process. It is recognised that in the case of South Africa, governmental reticence to provide reparations, the judicial disregard for pursuing prosecutions, and the dismissal of responsibility for apartheid at a wider social level, have been identified as factors that are limiting the opportunities for reconciliation and developmental change. Ghana is likely to suffer a similar fate if the key recommendations made by the NRC are not carried through. (Appiagyei-Atua, 2008: 5)

⁶ In this regard, we are grateful to CDD-Ghana's E. Gyimah-Boadi, Franklin Oduro and Abdul Wahab-Musah for their assistance.

⁷ In an issues paper, Attafua also recommended the "education of the Ghanaian public on the NRC Report by: producing hard and digitized copies of Executive Summary, disseminating the Report widely throughout Ghana and at all Ghana missions abroad and making copies available to all educational and

professional training institutions (from the primary school to the universities) (2007: 8). He regarded the dissemination as a joint task for both the state and civil society.

⁸ An exception was an online feature written by a PNDC sympathiser to attack the integrity of the NRC law (Sangaparee, 2014). Another exception was Ghanaian politician Dr Nyaho Nyaho-Tamakloe's response to "fond reminiscences of the June 4, 1979 coup" by another politician, describing this as "inappropriate nostalgia" in light of the NRC's revelations and exhortations (Aziz, 2014). Nyaho-Tamakloe made similar comments, invoking the NRC Report in 2013 (Asmah, 2013). Similarly, the children of Major-General Edward Utuka (who was killed by the AFRC) referenced the NRC Report in response to comments made by Rawlings in 2014 rationalising the AFRC killings. In a press release, they stated that "Our father was murdered without any semblance of a proper and fair trial by Rawlings and his cohorts. Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) member Captain Baah Achamfuor and Squadron Leader Kosi Dargbe, Chairman of Rawlings' kangaroo court apparatus confirmed this on oath before the National Reconciliation Commission" (Ofori-Adeniran, 2014).

⁹ The NPP's preoccupation with the pragmatic dimension of transitional justice at the expense of the normative aspect, can be seen in the party's 2011 election as parliamentary candidate Victor Okaikoi, a human rights abuse perpetrator in the AFRC regime. Okaikoi had been a member of the Pre-Trial Investigative Team (PIT), an AFRC organ that tortured former government officials (Okaikoi and Koda, 1979; Jackson, 1999; Tagoe 2003; Mensah, 2003a; Mensah, 2003b; Mensah and Weiss 2003; Ghana NRC 2004, Vol. 2 Ch. 6). A number of witnesses appeared before the NRC to provide disturbing testimony about the torture they suffered under the hands of Okaikoi and his colleagues in the PIT. For example, Colonel (Rtd.) Kofi Jackson, a victim of the AFRC, testified that: "Capt. Okaikoi who was one of the interrogators came to sit on the table in front of me and put his legs in between my thighs. He started punching holes with a big needle in my chest" (Mensah, 2003c). Okaikoi never apologised for his past and the NPP could not claim to be oblivious to his antecedents.

Interestingly, after winning the NPP's nomination, Okaikoi attempted to frame himself as a past opponent of the AFRC and hence, its victim, rather than an active participant (Gadugah, 2012). This was in spite of the existence of records in the NRC Report showing otherwise, suggesting that the NRC Report is yet to be mainstreamed in Ghana.

¹⁰ Our argument here contrasts observations by Valji (2006) that the NPP might have been ambivalent about the NRC in general because the party's members would have preferred prosecuting AFRC and PNDC elements to opting for the TRC process. Based on interactions with Ghanaian politicians, we can confirm that many senior NPP elements would have preferred prosecutions for perpetrators of past human rights abuses. However, we are also aware that the return to constitutional rule has created a political elite that straddles the political divide, giving rise to a politics of compromise that creates a reticence to bring to account high-level political officials. The NPP appeared therefore to have accepted the NRC as a more pragmatic option to achieve national reconciliation.

¹¹ These phenomena have been documented by CDD Ghana (CDD 2009a; 2010a; 2010b). In 2007, CDD-Ghana predicted the ill-portends of the "foot-soldier" menace in Ghana (CDD, 2007). During the biometric voter registration exercise in April-May 2012, ethnic political mobilisation became the basis of a series of violent attacks and vitriolic discourse. The Ghana Catholic Bishops Conference, among others, has had to comment on the troubling state of affairs (Suleman, 2012. See also Duodu, 2012; Alidu and Ameh, 2012; and Donkor et al., 2012).

¹² In 2015, following violent political clashes during a parliamentary by-election in Northern Ghana, the Interior Minister proposed licensing and thus regularising political militias (Ansah, 2015).

¹³ For example, in January 2014, Supreme Court judge William Atuguba warned as follows: "Those who downplay the importance of social justice from time to time are bound to be rudely awakened to the magnitude of that error by events not only that have locally happened in Ghana; I refer to the several coup d'états or revolutions...they were all based on denials of social justice" (<http://edition.radioxyzonline.com/pages/news/01082014-1855/17175.stm>). In July 2013, NPP MP Boniface Gambilla was reported to have praised the AFRC's "House Cleaning" exercise (<http://edition.radioxyzonline.com/pages/news/07142013-1415/13284.stm>), a euphemism for a purge akin to the Red Terror in Ethiopia under Dictator

Mengistu Haile Mariam. In August 2012, Kobina Arthur-Kennedy, another NPP politician, lauded the relevance and virtues of the AFRC coup (Gyasiwaa 2012). These personalities glossed over the human rights abuses that occurred as a result of the coup. The NRC cautioned against the tendency for the media and opinion leaders to shrilly vilify constitutional regimes and rationalise politically expedient human rights violations. The NRC was concerned that such interlocutors fail to inculcate in the public the patience required for democratic growth, and by their comments “have helped to prepare the ground for usurpers to step in, and use the media-led complaints as the justification for the seizure of power” and human rights violations (NRC 2004 Vol. 4 Ch. 3: 195).

¹⁴ Comments made by President J.E.A. Mills (then the NDC’s presidential candidate) to the Political Attaché at the US Embassy in Accra which have been revealed by Wikileaks make interesting reading. The brief indicates that the attaché:

“...asked Mills what an NDC victory would mean for the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), which has completed its hearings (but not yet issued a final report) on alleged human rights abuses that took place between 1957 and 1993 (Note: a majority of the alleged abuses occurred under the PNDC’s rule.) Mills said he would study the NRC report and implement the portions that appeared ‘logical.’ While not condemning the NR process, he said he would not accept the report wholesale. If the report is biased, he would set up a new, bipartisan commission to give the process a fresh start.” (<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/09/04ACCRA1934.html>).

After assuming office in January 2009, however, the Mills administration failed to act on the NRC Report. After he died in office in 2012, his party went on to win the 2012 elections and is still in power.

¹⁵ In his recently-published memoirs, Obed Asamoah who served as Foreign Minister and Attorney General in various PNDC/NDC administrations said of the NRC that it had “ostensibly noble objectives, but the purpose was to target the AFRC and PNDC rule of Flt. Lt. Rawlings” (Asamoah, 2004: 501). The following Wikileaks entry of a conversation between an NDC official and the US Ambassador to Ghana is noteworthy:

...former and current NDC members remain concerned that the commission’s report will be used to prosecute key figures of the PNDC, under whose rule many of the alleged human rights abuses took place. On August 2, an NDC Member of Parliament, in a private lunch, told the Ambassador that Rawlings was concerned about the possibility of being prosecuted for crimes that were revealed during the NRC’s hearings, and that this concern affects his decisions about foreign travel. (https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ACCRA1631_a.html)

Full Length Research Paper

Beyond classical peace paradigm: A theoretical argument for a ‘Glocalized Peace and Security’

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Throughout ages, one of the greatest needs of humans has been a peaceful and secured society devoid of violence. In pursuit of this agenda, different approaches including classical peace paradigm have been employed at different times in the world history. Ironically, these peace and security architectures largely tend to be state centric, where peace and security are construed in terms of military might and states monopoly of violence. Arguably, the dynamics of contemporary world has proved that nation states are all vulnerable to natural and physical calamities such as earthquakes, typhoons and infectious diseases (example AIDS and Ebola), criminal net-works operating across the globe manifested in violent demonstrations as experienced in Egypt, terrorist attack in America, arbitrary kidnapping and bombardment in Nigeria, and narcotic drugs trafficking among others. These developments suggest that nation states have to ‘think beyond the box’ of national boundaries. Data gathered through critical review of secondary sources demonstrated that classical peace paradigm is deficient and global peace is also not attainable. This paper therefore makes a case for ‘glocalized peace and security architecture’, an approach which is domestically relevant and internationally feasible.

Key words: Classical peace paradigm, globalization, peace and security, glocalized peace and security.

INTRODUCTION

Issues of peace and security continue to dominate both domestic and international politics due to the upsurge of networks of criminality and chains of natural disasters in the global environment. People throughout the world, in developing and developed countries alike, live under varied conditions of insecurity due to violence and conflict, international networks of terrorists and criminals, pandemics and natural disasters (Brown et al., 2007;

Commission on Human Security, 2003).

In pursuit of peace and security agenda, different approaches have been employed at different times in the world history. For instance, as noted by Oliver (2008), orthodox or traditional theories (idealism, realism, liberalism, etc.) have different perspective of how peace and security could be achieved in the state and the world as a whole. Each theory (school of thought) has its own

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inherent strengths and weaknesses. The irony is that the various peace designs largely tend to be inward-looking, focusing on state power and to a large extent have not engendered the needed peace and security both domestically and internationally. Our contemporary world has been greatly dented and still suffers from destructive conflicts. Violence of all forms has afflicted all continents and fragmented or undermined the integrity of several nation-states including Somalia, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Bosnia, East Timor, Kashmir Region of India and Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Libya and Syria among others. Tremendous harm has been done to ordinary people and innocent communities, and somehow these innocent people will have to find a way to move beyond the atrocities that they have endured and rebuild their lives (Murithi, 2009).

The hitherto classical approach to threat founded on realist political philosophy of state power and conflict settlement has largely been challenged by most contemporary sub-national conflicts such as civil wars (Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s), ethnic violence (Rwanda in 1994), violent agitations (Tunisia and Morocco in 2011), and popular demonstrations (Mali in 2014; Burkina Faso in 2014/2015) among others and proved less effective. The complexity and enormity of today's security threats call for a deeper reflection on strategies of peace and security. Natural catastrophes such as deadly diseases including Ebola as plagued some West African States notably Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone in 2014, destructive typhoons in Philippines in 2011/2013, destructive social conflicts around the globe, network of terrorists activities by al-Qaeda as witnessed in America in 2001, the arbitrary bombardment, kidnapping and execution of people in Nigeria by Boko Haram Islamist Group, and ruthless attacks on defenceless students, tourists and civilian population in Somalia and Kenya by al-Shabab, demand that states have to think beyond the 'box' or boundaries of national security in which security is narrowly defined on the basis of military might, monopoly of violence and containment.

This paper theoretically seeks to make a case for a 'glocalized peace and security architecture,' a comprehensive peace and security design which is both domestically or inward-looking relevant and internationally or outside-looking practicable. It attempts to suggest an approach which can foster a peaceful co-existence among states without necessarily endangering domestic politics in a seemingly chaotic global environment. The paper argues that classical peace and security paradigm offers an important set of tools to understand peace and security frameworks for states, especially in the wake of arbitrary terrorists' attacks as manifested in Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia and France among others, which cannot be ignored. Nonetheless, state-centric approach to peace offers a part of analysis and understanding pertaining to global threats to peace

and security and there is the need to integrate this approach to the over-all peace and security agenda. In line with the objective, the paper is structured into six major parts. Part one looks at the introduction to the study while part two critiques classical peace and security paradigm, its strengths, weaknesses and response to criticisms. Part three looks at the conceptual explanation of globalization, peace and security and glocalized peace and security. Part four captures the method adopted in gathering the relevant data while part five discusses the theoretical argument for glocalized peace and security architecture. The last part, part six is devoted to the conclusion and references.

Classical peace and security paradigm

Classical approach to peace and security is mainly an inward-looking design where peace and security are construed in terms of military might and states monopoly of violence (CHS, 2003). This approach has been fashioned out by states on the basis of realist peace agenda. The thrust of realist philosophy is that, the drive for power and the domination of others for self-advantage is a universal and permanent motive throughout world history (Kegley, 2009). What exist (ontology) according to realist is the state. The state therefore is the focus of analysis in terms of international relations.

Classical peace paradigm stresses on victor's peace. By implication, peace and sustainability are based upon victor's hegemony. Peace therefore is construed as a zero-sum game (Oliver, 2008). Realists have inclined to Hobbes idea of state of nature and on this basis have formulated their theory of international relations, believing that, states are in constant war of survival (Bruce and Oneal, 2001). The philosophical ideas of classical peace are underpinned by realist concept of peace through strength. In practice this has manifested in the stockpiling of arms by states and the institutionalization and capacity building of security operatives (Barash and Webel, 2009).

Classical approach to peace and security to some extent has contributed to world agenda of peace. For instance, Realist theory of international relation has given us an understanding as to what pertains on the international setting and the need for state security (Oliver, 2008). The incessant quest of Germany for political power and to lord over European states in the 20th century for instance, could not have come to an end had it not been war, for that matter violence (Jordan, 2007). This at least brought some sanity on the international setting as well as the security within the European states in particular. In the current state of terrorists' activities and drug trafficking among others, state security cannot be ignored.

The use of war, for that matter violence, as an instrument of peace may be contested by many people.

We may for instance, question the morality and the justification for the UN to use force as part of its conflict resolution mechanisms. We may equally argue if the use of force could be valid and applicable in some situations to preserve peace, typically the situation of Rwanda in the 1990s where the UN supposedly look-warm respond resulted in the genocide of about 85000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus (Chesterman, 2001). The reality is that wars have frequently shaken up the existing socio-political order and have resulted in many changes, both positive and negative. Through violent struggles, most African countries including Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Tanzania and Zimbabwe have liberated themselves from the shackles of colonialism (Van Rensburg, 1981).

Classical peace philosophy of mutually assured destruction among states, to some extent brought relative peace to the global world in the second half of the 20th century though it did not suggest any plan for the establishment of peace. This could also explain why the so-called 'Cold War' between the then (nuclear) super powers USA and USSR did not explode into violent confrontation even though it manifested in violent confrontations (proxy war) in some countries including Lebanon, Chechnya, Sri Lanka and Democratic Republic of Congo (Murithi, 2009). Curle (1995) has described the Cold War as horrible, absurd and disastrous which benumbed global good sense and political judgment, which cannot be ignored. Nonetheless, it was in a way constructive as it brought some amount of relative peace to the world arena.

Regardless of the positive contributions of classical approach to peace and security, its philosophy and overall practice is embedded with several weaknesses to suggest a more holistic approach to global threats to peace and security in the face of current realities. Classical approach to peace and security is shrouded with a number of flaws which calls for a redefinition of peace and security. The belief that humans are inherently violent and driven for power (human nature) which forms the basis of realist agenda for peace is much challenged. The contention by critics including Oliver (2008) is that it is difficult to understand how the behaviour of individuals at the micro level could be transferred to the state or the macro level. This makes classical peace and security approach theory of international relation questionable.

The focus on state security and the perceived threat on the international arena underlining classical peace approach generally, has resulted in the intensification and stockpiling of arms by states. This often fuels international conflicts. State-centrism has manifested in frequent questionable attacks by states, all in the name of security and humanitarian assistance as demonstrated by United States, United Kingdom and France air strike against Iraq in the 1990s under the cover of Operation Provide Comfort (Chesterman, 2001). Draconian law, outright aggression, human right abuse and immigration control among others, all in the name of security against

terrorism are a new global order.

The conviction that states are the sole actors on the international setting and the deliberate disregard of other non-state actors makes the whole idea of peace pretentious. In contemporary times, most multilateral corporations and other non-state organizations such as Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have been proven to be wielding power even more than states. A fall in oil production for instance, leading to high world oil price often results in chaos and insecurity within most nation states, especially developing states including Ghana. As noted by the Commission on Human Security (CHS) (2003), states are important but not the sole actors. The report indicated that regional and international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society are all involved in managing security issues including the fight against HIV/AIDS, the ban against landmines and massive mobilizations in support of human rights. A peace agenda which neglects the contributions of non-state actors can only be considered as a narrow-minded peace.

The perceived monopoly of violence by states which often result in abnormal state behaviour is much challenged in contemporary times. Internal clashes among the populace and violent clashes between civilians and the state in most countries especially in Somalia, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Thailand, Libya, Nigeria and Egypt among others either for autonomy, better living conditions, secession or mere terrorist attack have exposed the flaws in the state monopoly power philosophy. Although states still wield power, yet, the notion of state monopoly of violence is now a fallacy. Pursuing peace and security agenda mainly on the basis of realist philosophy is an implication that states are still thinking within the narrow framework of national sovereignty, an error in our contemporary dynamic world.

In response to critics of classical realism, modern realism also known as neo-realism sees power as a possibly useful means, with states running risks if they have either too little or too much of it. Neo-realists believe that sensible statesmen try to have an appropriate amount of power. Power is therefore not viewed as an ultimate or end to itself as assumed by classical realism. Neo-realism contents that in crucial situation, the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security. It rejects the assumption that human's innate lust for power constitutes a sufficient cause of war. It argues that the competition for scarce resources and the lack of an arbiter under conditions of anarchy, resulting in the struggle for power is the cause of conflicts but not necessarily due to the evil born in humans (Waltz, 1988). These revisions by neo-realism are very important as they seek to widen the mechanisms for peace and security in a supposedly chaotic environment. Nonetheless, the conviction that states in an anarchic order must provide for their own security and threats, the emphasis on mistrust, suspicion, self-help and survival

underlining neo-realists thought, are manifestation that neo-realism is equally power-driven. In practice, there is no significant difference between classical realism and neo-realism. As pointed out by Waltz (1988:624-5), 'realist theory, both old and new alike, draws attention to the crucial role of military technology and strategy among forces that fix the fate of states and their systems'.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK UNDERPINNING THE STUDY

Globalization

Globalization has become an emerging term in both domestic and international politics. Ironically, the term lacks a universally accepted definition and has become a subject of controversy among scholars from the field of political science, development studies, economics and conflict, peace and security studies. Globalization is generally touted as the process of integrating world economies, technologies and socio-cultural and political forces (World Bank Policy Report, 2002). According to Schaefer (2005), globalization is the worldwide integration of government policies, cultures, social movements, and financial markets through trade and the exchange of ideas. Olufemi and Marcheta (2005) have pointed out that, the term globalization evokes images of the triumph of the free market system, massive capital flow, global information revolution, innovations in science, new-transnational cultural expressions and rapidly shifting demographic conditions. It is largely understood as a universal process characterised by democracy and capitalistic values that are sweeping the post-Cold War era.

Schaefer (2005) has indicated that, globalization is not universally welcomed as many critics see it as the domination of business without borders, benefiting the rich particularly, the very wealthy industrial countries at the expense of the poor in less developed nations. Nonetheless, it has an attendance benefits. He asserted that many developing nations are taking their place in the world of commerce and bringing in much needed income. He argues that the communications revolution helps people to stay connected and gives them access to knowledge that can improve living standards and even save lives. This of course cannot be denied. Goldman (2005) (Oliver, 2008:86) equally has indicated that globalization is associated with the spread of technology, communication and, of course, a dominant neo-liberal economic model taken to be unifying processes that build upon the liberal argument of peace through trade. Globalization is seen as contributing to peace because of its inherent qualities which promote liberalisation, democratisation, development, human rights and free trade. It is largely perceived as an integrated force necessary for building up peace and security among

nations. Critics, however, see this proposition as a Western liberal agenda, and an extension or a successor to imperialism and colonialism that oppressed Third World nations for centuries (Schaefer, 2005). Critics of globalization asserted that the benefits of free trade are disproportional in favour of the developed nations although nations stand to gain when freely interact through trade. As noted by Oliver (2008), there is some evidence that globalization provides disincentives to war and promotes humanitarianism and pluralism, and it has also produced conflicts, as well as other ills such as environmental degradation, poverty and social disintegration. The World Bank Policy Report (2002) indicated that globalization produces winners and losers both between countries and within them.

The arguments above suggest that globalization can provide an avenue for peace and at the same time an instrument of destruction of societies which needs to be creatively confronted. The ability to maximize the benefits of globalization through interdependence, international cooperation and support, and at the same time productively managing its attendance conflicts in domestic politics lies in the purview of 'glocalized peace and security architecture', which has been the focus of this paper.

Peace and security

Peace and security are contested concepts. According to Barash and Weber (2009), peace like many theoretical terms, is difficult to define. They however, argue that, like happiness harmony, justice and freedom, peace is something we recognize by its absence. Traditionally, peace has been equated to the absence of war and other forms of large-scale violent human conflicts which Galtung refers to as negative peace (Barash and Weber, 2009:4). Some authorities including Murithi (2009) contend that negative peace or pacifist peace is a one sided peace. They opine that a holistic peace also referred to as positive peace postulates the presence of negative peace (absence of war or violence) together with social, economic and political justice. By implication, peace in its elaborated sense can be explained as a web of safety, welfare, justice, prosperity and respect. It is construed as a state of being devoid of destruction, fear, harm, threat or physical attack together with socio-economic justice.

Like peace, security is also all-encompassing term involving freedom from military threat to national sovereignty (state security) as well as freedom from want- human-centred security (Boutros-Ghali, 1994; UNDP, 1994). In essence, threats to security go beyond military threats to sovereignty of states and touch on the vital core of the people also referred to as human security. Human security concerns itself with empowerment - aiming at developing the capabilities of

individuals and communities to make informed choices and act on their own as well as protection of the people, by shielding them from all manner of menace which affect their development. It focuses on good governance, education and healthcare and access to economic opportunities (The Commission on Human Security (CHS, 2003).

Peace and security are bedfellows and essentially preconditions for sustainable development (Brown et al., 2007). For instance, the arbitrary bombardment, abduction and execution of people in certain parts of Nigeria by Boko Haram militants (Daily Graphic, 2015) have rendered parts of the country insecure. This equally has robbed the peace of the people.

Glocalized peace and security

Glocalization is a hybrid concept involving 'global' and 'local'. Local can be used interchangeably with indigenous- an act or practice which is peculiar to a given people, community or a country (Marfo, 2014). States are different by virtue of their levels of income and development, their geographical location and natural/scientific resource base, and the composition and diversity of their populations as well as the agglomeration of the aspirations and visions of these populations. Such differences also explain the difference in security set-ups of states and how peace is pursued.

The idea of global on the other hand presupposes what exists everywhere. Global could therefore be used synonymously with terms such as 'international' or 'universal'. With reference to peace and security, global peace and security may imply 'peace and security that exist everywhere'. Given the fact that we do not have a world government or supra-state to enforce the tenets of peace and security, thinking of world or universal peace and security would be something which could be more of an illusion than reality. By implication it is relatively easy to pursue peace and security within states (state security) rather than among states (global security). However, as indicated by Bruce and Oneal (2001), in reality, states are not the only actors on the world scene even though they are the most commonly considered in the world politics. They argue that other actors or entities including international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) exist, and whether their purpose is overtly political or not, they may affect national and international politics profoundly. This also makes classical peace paradigm deficient. Consequently, in designing any domestic peace and security scheme by states, their sense of duty to other actors on the international scene cannot be ignored. As noted by Rise (2007), in a globalizing world that must contend increasingly with transnational security threads, weak states hobbled by poverty and corruption do not only pose deadly risk to their own citizens, but the

consequences can and do spill-over borders into neighbouring countries and even to far-flung regions of the world.

The pursuance of global peace and security will largely fail simply because, globalization though integrating states together through trade and migration among others, does not necessarily tear down the socio-cultural, economic and political barriers that tend to separate people of different states. States still retain their sovereignty. A security design which is relevant to a supposedly 'all' (universal) states, may not necessarily be good for a given state, and may require an adaptation. For instance, the promotion of same-sex marriage by the international community under the facade of human rights as a means of promoting peace and security both within and across nations has incurred the displeasure of some local members and religious bodies in Ghana and Australia among others. Local community members in Ghana only believe and practice heterosexual sex construed as a union between a man and a woman who have undergone through all the practices and customs and have been accepted by the society as married couples. Community members do not accept neither do they tolerate 'man to man' or 'woman to woman' partners as this practice is considered outrageous. In 2014 for instance, some supposedly same-sex partners were chased from their communities in Accra the capital of Ghana by irritated local people who perceived their sexual relations as abominable. If globalization means an automatic adoption of an idea spearheaded by the international community, then in Ghana same-sex marriage is found to be a negative force fomenting tension and insecurity in the country. The Criminal Code of Ghana, Act 29/60, Section 105, criminalizes act of sodomy and other unnatural carnal knowledge. According to Aviles (2015), in Australia, the Presbyterian Church has voiced its disapproval and has firmly decided to withdraw from a proposed Marriage Act purported to legalise same-sex marriage. According to Aviles, this has petted the Church against the state authorities and has equally divided the country's parliament.

Blanket importation of peace design in the name of globalization can have disastrous consequences on domestic politics and needs a rethinking. The South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process as influenced by 'Ubuntu', an indigenous South African ethical principle is a classic case of how a glocalized peace and security can be achieved. South Africa subscribes to the Western classical approach to conflict resolution also known as the global conflict resolution mechanism which stresses on retributive justice. However, in the post-conflict reconstruction and peace building process, it became necessary for the TRC to adapt the retributive Western conflict resolution and reconciliation mechanisms in order to ensure a meaningful conflict resolution and co-existence among the divided people in South Africa brought about by long

standing atrocities. In view of this, in the process of the Commission's work, Desmond Tutu, the chairman constantly referred to the principle of Ubuntu, which focuses on the ethics of love, empathy, sharing, caring, forgiveness, cooperation and restoration in dealing with common problems which underline the essence of humanity (Murithi, 2006) as opposed to the more retributive justice characterizing the Western conflict resolution mechanism. Ubuntu is a tacit principle which indicates that a person is a person through other persons (Ramose, 1999).

South Africa's peace building process was far from perfection yet, it can be said that the adaptation of the global conflict resolution mechanisms to the needs of the local people provided both the perpetrators and victims opportunities to apologize and forgive respectively rather than resorting to revenge or purely retributive action. This contributed to the success of the TRC which has become a show case globally. The principle of Ubuntu implies that we can create a healthy relationships based on the recognition that within the web of humanity, everyone is linked to everyone else.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION

This paper takes a theoretical look at glocalized peace and security by proposing that states have to think beyond the box of national sovereignty, military might and conflict settlement which over the years have dominated international politics. On the basis of the objective of the paper, the historical approach was adopted. In view of this secondary sources pertaining to the global political discourse and developments from published books, journal articles and official websites were critically reviewed and formed the bases of what could be termed as a road map to glocalized peace and security architecture. The paper was motivated by the Kantian Perpetual Peace Triangle Concept. Kant in his attempt to develop a theory of global peace and security proposed the adoption of three interactive phenomena namely; International Organizations, Democracy and Economic Interdependence (Bruce and Oneal, 2001:157). The Kantian Peace Triangle was found to be useful in this paper as it does not limit the search and the possible achievement of meaningful peace and security solely within states but equally included the need for external collaboration and support. This conforms to what this paper terms as 'glocalized peace and security architecture'.

A CASE FOR GLOCALIZED PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

This section of the paper discusses the changing nature of the world and the justification or the need for states to think beyond national boundaries. This is the thrust of the paper.

Sources of threats

Sources of threats to peace and security of nations in contemporary times are many and varied and therefore

demand a more cooperative spirit by states, rather than a single effort from a state. The proliferation of weapons especially small arms and light weapons, terrorists activities (the 9/11/2001 attack on US as a case of reference); destructive social conflicts (Algeria, Libya, Rwanda, Syria, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, etc.); internet fraud; ritual murder ("sakawa" in Ghana); refugee crisis especially in Africa, Middle East and Asia; annual floods in Ghana, Pakistan and India; intermittent fire outbreaks in Ghana, America and Australia for instance, and environmental degradation among others, are of major concern. These sources of threats fundamentally have shaped the peace and security of societies. These sources of threats demand a more all-encompassing pragmatic and cooperative approach, both bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Globalization and ICT

Globalization of the world - the process of integrating world economies, technologies and socio-cultural and political forces, to a large extent has rendered states borderless complicating security problems. The increase interconnectedness of states through free flow of goods and services due to globalization has exposed states and individuals around the world to common threats and vulnerability (Brown et al., 2007). The role of cell phones, fast moving planes, the internet and satellites among others, have facilitated criminal activities and escape from justice (example: al-Qaeda, Islamic State and Boko Haram network operatives). The advent of communicable diseases such as avian flu and Ebola which span across nations and continents through contact suggest that no country is immune to natural disasters. These developments demand in-depth security approach and a call for institutional collaboration both within and across states.

Conflict dynamics

Conflicts in today's world are no longer limited between states (inter-states conflicts) but most especially, within states (intra-states conflicts) demanding a new approach to conflict resolution. Somalia, Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, South Sudan and Syria are among countries presently experiencing turbulent intra-state conflicts. The hitherto existing conflict resolution bodies including the UN, AU, EU and ECOWAS, etc. which were established primarily to deal with inter-state conflicts appear to have over-lived their usefulness. The search for a more dynamic conflict resolution mechanism or new approaches capable, especially, of dealing with sub-national or intra-states conflicts is imperative. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program for instance, of the 31 wars in the world in 2005, all were armed conflicts fought within nations between communities divided by

ethnicity, language, religion, and or geography. Nearly all military deployments, UN peacekeeping operations, and peace building missions in recent decades have taken place in settings of intra-state conflict (Cortright, 2008:5). These developments challenge the hitherto state-centric philosophy emphasizing on containment. A re-definition of security to encompass human security which is human-centred is a key to most of today's deadly agitations and confrontations.

National security and human security dichotomy

Earlier conception of threat which focuses primarily on military threat of a sovereign state to another is much challenged by frequent insecurity emanating from socio-economic forces. In the 1994 Annual Report of the UN, entitled 'Building Peace and Development', Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then UN Secretary General indicated that the definition of security in the altered context of today's world is no longer limited to questions of land and weapons but now encompasses economic well-being, environmental sustainability and the protection of human rights. The 2011 Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt turmoil popularly known as the Arab Spring was fundamentally rooted in unmet or unfulfilled socio-economic needs including employment and poverty as well as issues of marginalization, etc (Alcinda, 2011; Maggie, 2011). This demands a re-thinking or a new perspective of threats as opposed to classical view of threats construed crudely as military threats to national sovereignty. Effective maintenance of peace and security calls for a comprehensive institutional reforms that embrace democratic ethos of freedom of speech, good governance, rule of law, economic empowerment as well as environmental security.

Military-civilian dichotomy

Just as today's wars are no more fought between nation-states or within geographically designated "war fronts", so are the victims of today's violent conflicts mainly not soldiers but mostly civilians. The use of civilians as human shield, as well as the large numbers of casualties of direct and indirect war demands that the approach to peace and security issues must be transformed. The advances in military technology in recent times have made wars themselves more deadly, especially for nearby civilians. Military deaths were roughly the same in World Wars I and II (about 17 million in each war), but civilian deaths in World War II (approximately 35 million) were about seven times greater than in World War I (Barash and Weber, 2009). Cortright (2008) writes that the number of people dying in war in recent years has been extremely high. He asserted that more than 80 percent of the casualties in today's conflicts are civilians,

and the number of refugees and displaced persons has increased sharply. We can think of the civilian death toll associated with the activities of the militant Islamist Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Tuareg rebels in Mali and the al-Shabab militant in Somalia and its extended atrocities in Kenya. We need a thorough understanding of the lethal nature of contemporary weapons and strategies adopted in waging conflicts, as well as productive means of resolving conflicts and managing refugee crisis without the recourse to violence.

Challenge of common sense

Contemporary developments challenge classical notion of conflict actors and call for a shift in conflict mapping or analysis. Wars are no longer fought on conventional basis as the enemy in most instances is unknown. Global fight against terrorists is a point of reference. The attackers of the US on 9/11/2001 were purportedly styled students. This calls for a comprehensive understanding of peace and security issues and a new perspective of threats to security.

Besides, parties' in contemporary destructive conflicts are no longer only limited to soldiers but involving people of diverse social, economic, religious and political backgrounds. The deadly attacks on US on 9th September 2001 as indicated earlier, was said to have caused by professed/styled students, with Osama Bin Laden, the wealthy man as the main architect. The arrest of Eric Amoateng, Member of Parliament (MP) from Ghana in US in 2005 for heroin, and the security boss of Kotoka International Airport (Ghana), Solomon Adelaquaye in US with Afghan heroin together with 2 Nigerians and a Columbian in May 2013, is a manifestation of today's complex criminal network of operation. A new view of conflict and criminal actors is considered important. This demonstrates that the safety of individual state depends on the extent to which it collaborates and commits itself to international bilateral, multilateral and regional security and peace norms and designs. By implication, states have to 'think beyond the box' of classical myopic view of threats to peace and security.

Cost of peace and security

Today's problems mostly overwhelm (over-tax) individual states demanding external assistance and cooperation. The concern of the international community about the 2011 Ivorian crisis was a food for thought. Terrorists activities around the globe, typhoon disasters, earthquakes, as well as the AIDS pandemic are a major concern to the international community as they threaten the stability of most nations especially, war-torn countries in Africa. The 2014 outbreak of Ebola disease which has

claimed the lives of scores of people in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone in particular in West Africa, and witnessed overwhelming international support, calls for a closer collaboration beyond national boundaries. The need to develop new avenues of cooperation to reduce both natural and social hazards within and between states cannot be overemphasized. This demands a paradigm shift of classical approach to threats.

Conclusion

This paper suggests that the hitherto classical peace and security paradigm pursued by states on the basis of Realist agenda (state-centric peace or inward looking peace), offers an important set of tools to understand peace and security frameworks for states. These insights are an important part of any discussion of peace but only a part. This paper therefore makes a case for 'glocalized peace and security architecture'. The dramatic changes which we are witnessing in contemporary societies call for a critical look at issues pertaining to peace and security beyond the framework of realist paradigm. Fisher (2002) has pointed out that the world today continues to be besieged by a host of destructive and apparently intractable conflicts between groups, factions, and nations that induce incredible costs in human and material terms and sap the resources so badly needed for human development. In support of Fisher's assertion, Kegley (2009: xvii) argues that, '*the globe is undergoing a constant and rapid change. Only informed interpretations of world conditions and trend trajectories and cogent explanations of why they exist and how they are unfolding can provide the tools necessary for understanding the world and making it better*'. Trans-border crimes notably drug and child trafficking; armed robbery and terrorists activities; natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes and diseases (EBOLA and HIV/AIDS) which over-tax communities and nation-states resources necessitate external or global assistance; globalization of the world - diffusion of culture and technologies; quick means of transport and communication due to the advent of ICT which facilitate crime commission and means of criminal escape; and easy access to means of destruction as a result of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, calls for individuals and collective groups participation as well as international cooperation among states in our quest for a meaningful and sustainable peace and security. Peace and security are complex social tasks and demand a multi-faceted approach. For a meaningful peace and security to be achieved, states have to think beyond classical peace and security paradigm construed in terms of military threat to national sovereignty. As noted by the WBPR (2002: 125), the internationalization of terrorism is an instance of how global threats have outpaced global policy. The report further indicates that the spread of

terrorists organizations across national boundaries have made national-level, counter-terrorist activity less effective. Approach to glocalized peace and security postulates institutional reforms and sectorial collaboration within states, as well as more commitment and cooperative attitude among states.

Conflict of interests

The authors hereby declare that no conflict of interest exists among them.

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